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I. INTRODUCTION
Seven of the top 20 largest wildfires in California history occurred
within the last decade.1 At the time of this publication, the top two largest 
wildfires in California history occurred in the last two years.2 Since 2007, 
trends show an increase in the number of wildfires ignited, total area 
burned, and total impact on ecosystems.3 The California Department of 
Forestry and Fire Protection (“Cal Fire”) notes that these increasing trends 
mirror the signatures of climate change, which include “rising mean 
temperatures and increasing length of fire seasons.”4 As climate patterns 
continue to shift, this trend can be expected to continue. 
These wildfires can be ignited naturally or by human activities like camp 
fires, debris burning, and intentional acts of arson.5 Five percent of wildfire 
ignitions in California are attributed to electric utilities.6 These fires typically 
start when high winds bring down power lines or conductors, or when animals 
or vegetation make contact with power lines.7 High wind speeds also create
conditions where wildfires spread more rapidly and are harder to contain.8 
Given these conditions, utility-ignited wildfires tend to be larger and more 
destructive.9 
Courts consistently hold electric utility companies strictly liable for all 
costs related to property damages, suppression costs, and other economic 
and natural resource damages arising from a utility-started wildfire.10 This
strict liability standard is rooted in the principle of inverse condemnation 
which holds that if a public entity damages private property in pursuit of 
a public purpose, that entity must provide just compensation.11 Historically, 
utilities cover these costs through customer rates and liability insurance. 
However, given the increase in wildfire frequency and California Courts’ 
1. CalFire Top 20 Largest Wildfires, Feb. 19, 2019, https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5510/ 
top20_acres.pdf [https://perma.cc/32RE-NPKN]. 
2. Id.
3. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire), 2018 Strategic 
Fire Plan for California, Aug. 22, 2018, at 6 [hereinafter Cal Fire Strategic Plan]. 
4. Id. at 7. 
5. Carolyn Kousky, Katherine Greig, Brett Lingle, and Howard Kunreuther,
Wildfire Costs in California: The Role of Electric Utilities, Wharton Risk Management and 
Data Processes Center, Univ. of Pennsylvania (Aug. 2018), at 3, https://riskcenter.wharton.
upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Wildfire-Cost-in-CA-Role-of-Utilities-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CP4H-B8U3]. 
6. Id. (based on an analysis of Cal Fire data from 2007 to 2016). 
7. Id.
 8. Id.
 9. Id. 
10. Id. at 5. 
11. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
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consistent adherence to the strict liability regime under inverse condemnation, 
insurance carriers have drastically reduced or eliminated their coverage.12 
The increasingly limited availability of insurance coverage places a large 
financial burden on investor-owned utilities who must then recover these
costs through either customer rates or shareholder profits. 
This Article addresses California Investor-Owned Utilities’ liability for
wildfire damage due to equipment failure and mismanagement. Part II 
highlights the doctrine of inverse condemnation and how California Courts 
apply the doctrine to cases involving investor-owned utilities. Part III provides 
an overview of the statutory and regulatory provisions that govern how a 
utility may recover costs through customer rates. Part IV addresses the 
apparent conflict between these frameworks and how utilities and regulators 
have sought to reconcile this conflict. Part V concludes with an overview 
and discussion of SB 901 which seeks to maintain utility financial stability 
while holding the entities accountable for their actions that gave rise to
catastrophic wildfires. 
II. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution states that “private 
property may be taken or damaged for a public use only when just
compensation . . . has first been paid to, or into the court for, the owner.”13 
Just compensation for public use is generally enforced through direct 
condemnation, or eminent domain proceedings, wherein a government actor
takes formal steps to acquire private property prior to a public use project. 
When private property is incidentally taken or damaged for public use, the 
owner may pursue an inverse condemnation claim against the government 
actor to receive just compensation. The policy rationale behind the inverse 
condemnation doctrine is to protect the owner of damaged property from 
contributing “more than his proper share to the public undertaking.”14 The
California Supreme Court holds that this strict liability doctrine allows for 
individual losses that arise from a public undertaking to be “distribute[d] 
throughout the community.”15 
12. Joint Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Southern California 
Edison Company, Southern California Gas Company, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 
A. 09-09-020, filed Aug. 31, 2009. 
13. CAL CONST. art. I § 19. 
14.  Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist., 47 Cal. 3d 550 (1988). 
15. Id.
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Courts have consistently held private, investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”) 
strictly liable for incidental property damage under this doctrine. The
policy rationale for extending application to IOUs represents the notion 
that the utility is in the best position to distribute costs amongst the general 
public, which benefits from the undertaking. Theoretically, such costs can
be recovered through customer rates. As we will see, this is not guaranteed.
Two major California court cases that illustrate how the court came to
justify this position towards IOUs are Barham v. Southern California Edison
Company and Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Southern California
Edison Company. Barham held that the determinative factor was the nature
of the service being provided rather than the nature of the entity. Pacific 
Bell reinforced the Barham court’s interpretation and rejected the notion 
that IOUs were exempt from a strict liability approach. 
A. Barham v. Southern California Edison Company
In Barham, various plaintiffs suffered property damage in the Mill
Creek Fire of 1993.16 The court determined that the fire resulted from a 
failure in Southern California Edison’s (“SCE’s”) overheard power line 
equipment.17 SCE claimed that inverse condemnation principles did not
apply because SCE was a privately-owned public utility, and not a public 
entity.18 In considering whether to apply inverse condemnation to the case,
the California Court of Appeal had to first determine whether SCE was 
properly considered a “public entity.” 
The court cited Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., in which 
the California Supreme Court stated that “a public utility is in many respects
more akin to a governmental entity than a purely private employer.”19 The 
Gay Law Students Court further held that “the nature of the California 
regulatory scheme demonstrates that the State generally expects a public 
utility to conduct its affairs more like a governmental entity than like 
a private corporation.”20 
The Court of Appeal in Barham then noted that municipal, publicly 
owned electric utilities have been held liable under inverse condemnation 
in virtually identical past cases.21 Because the appeals court did not find 
16.  Barham v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 74 Cal. App. 4th 744, 747 (1999). 
17. Id.
 18. Id. at 74 Cal. App. 4th 752. 
19. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 469 (1979),
 20. Id.
21. Barham v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 74 Cal. App. 4th 744, 753 (referencing 
Marshall v. Dept of Water and Power (1990), 219 Cal. App. 3d 1124; Aetna Life & Casualty 
Co. v. City of LA, 170 Cal. App. 3d 865). 
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any rational basis for distinguishing between privately and publicly owned 
utilities, the court found SCE liable as a public entity under the doctrine 
of inverse condemnation.22 
With the entity question answered, the court then considered whether 
SCE’s activities constituted “public use.” Officials traced the cause of the
Mill Fire back to faulty transmission lines located above SCE property.23 
SCE argued that this created a private rather than public use.24 The power 
lines in question, however, were responsible for providing electricity to 
more than 1,000 households.25 Citing to Slemons v. Southern Cal. Edison
Co., the court in Barham found that electric transmission to three customers 
constituted public use, and held that the transmission of electric power 
through the facilities that caused damage to the Barham’s property was 
for the benefit of the public.26 
Without much discussion, the California Court of Appeal’s 1999 decision
in Barham rejects the notion that there is any significant difference between
publicly and privately owned utilities.27 As such, the court found it reasonable
to hold Edison strictly liable in furtherance of the “fundamental policy 
underlying the concept of inverse condemnation.”28 The court’s opinion
ignored at least one fundamental difference between the two entities; the 
way in which costs may be recovered. 
B. Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Southern California  
Edison Company 
In Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Southern California Edison
Company, Pacific Bell asserted an inverse condemnation claim against 
SCE after a ground fault sent electricity through several telephone cables 
and caused $75,767.39 in damage.29 SCE attempted to escape inverse
condemnation by first arguing that the Barham court’s interpretation of 
22. Id.
 23. Id. at 74 Cal. App. 4th 753. 
24. Id. at 74 Cal. App. 4th 754. 
25. Id.
 26. Id. (citing Slemons v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 Cal. App. 2d 1026 (1967)). 
27. Id. at 753. 
28. Id. at 752. 
29. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Southern California Edison Co., 208 Cal. App. 4th
1400, 1403 (2012). 
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Supreme Court precedent was incorrect.30  SCE cited two California Supreme
Court cases where private entities were subject to inverse condemnation
because of their joint partnership with a government entity or their exercise 
of eminent domain power delegated by the Legislature.31 Since neither 
applied to Edison, it argued, inverse condemnation should not apply. 
The Court of Appeal in Pacific Bell rejected Edison’s narrow interpretation 
of these cases and found that while such circumstances could give rise to
inverse condemnation liability, they were not required.32 The court pointed to
the monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic authority of the utility to distinguish 
SCE from the private entities in those two cases.33 
Whereas the Barham court ignored the rate-recovery discrepancy, the
Pacific Bell court deemed it irrelevant to distinguish between publicly and
privately owned utilities. SCE argued that the loss-spreading rationale behind
inverse condemnation should not apply because SCE does not have taxing 
authority and can only raise rates with the approval of the California 
Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”).34 The court was not convinced by 
this argument, however, since SCE did not provide any evidence that the 
CPUC would prohibit cost recovery through rates.35 
Interestingly, the court also referenced in a footnote the California Supreme 
Court holding in County of Inyo v. Public Utilities Company. The court in 
that case held that the California Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature 
from charging the CPUC with regulating the rates of municipally owned
utilities as well.36 Without further explanation, the Pacific Bell court noted 
that such a restriction on ability to spread costs, should it arise, would not 
suffice to bar application of inverse condemnation liability to municipal 
utilities.37 
Both IOUs and municipally owned utilities (“MOUs”) recover a portion 
of their liability costs from their rate bases. Since MOU rates are not subject 
to regulatory review, MOUs may spread all liability costs across their rate 
base. This principle supports the loss-spreading rationale behind inverse
condemnation. IOUs, on the other hand, must have their rates reviewed 
and approved by the CPUC. As such, IOUs are often prohibited from
recovering certain liability costs through customer rates.
30. Id. at 208, Cal. App. 4th 1404. 
31. Id. at 1404 (citing Breidert v. Pacific Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659 (1964), 
Pettis v. General Tel. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 503 (1967)). 
 32. Id. at 1405. 
33. Id. at 1406. 
34. Id. at 1407. 
35. Id.
 36. Id. at n.6 (citing County of Inyo v. Public Utilities Com., 26 Cal.3d 154 (1980)). 
37. Id.
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The case’s footnote suggests that regulatory limitations on the ability to
recover costs through customer rates should have little to no bearing on 
inverse condemnation liability. While that interpretation upholds the 
Constitution’s protection of the private property owner, it discounts the 
loss-spreading rationale traditionally relied upon in inverse condemnation
cases. Thus, the disproportionate burden of the public use is essentially
shifted from the property owner to the IOU. 
There have been exceptions to this strict liability doctrine. In light of
policy concerns, the California Supreme Court developed a reasonableness
rule for assessing utility liability arising from flood control efforts. In general, 
the rule seeks to encourage beneficial flood control projects by only allowing 
compensation for property found to be unfairly damaged.38 Even if inverse 
condemnation applied, SCE requested that the Pacific Bell court use that 
same reasonableness standard because the operation of high voltage power 
lines implicated similar policy concerns.39 The Appeals Court in the Pacific 
Bell rejected this reasonableness standard on the basis that, unlike in the 
flood control cases, “it is the public improvement, not nature, that creates 
the risk of disaster.”40 
The court then referenced a California Court of Appeal decision in Pacific 
Bell v. City of San Diego.41 In that case, the plaintiff pursued an inverse
condemnation claim for damages from a burst pipe in the defendant city’s 
water delivery system.42 The defendant in that case argued that the flood-
case exemption ‘“supplanted the ordinary rule of strict liability with a rule 
of unreasonableness in constructing or maintaining the public improvement.’”43 
Although that case involved flooding, the exemption did not apply because 
the defendant utility was not acting to prevent an existing risk.44 Similarly,
since Pacific Bell’s lines suffered damage from a risk it would not have 
been exposed to in the absence of SCE’s lines, the exception was not 
applicable.45 
Collectively, Barham and Pacific Bell reflect the court’s firm stance on 
holding IOUs strictly liable for inverse condemnation claims. Like in 
38. Id. at 1409 (citing Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 14 Cal 4th 432 (1997).
 39. Id. at 1408. 
40. Id. at 1410. 
41. Id. at 1410. 
42.  Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, 81 Cal. App. 4th 596 (2000)
43.  Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, at 610. 
44. Id. at 614–15. 
45.  Pacific Bell v. Southern California Edison, at 1410–11. 
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Barham, this approach applies to property damage arising from wildfires
started by an IOU’s equipment. Traditionally, these costs are covered through
the IOU’s liability insurance. In recent years, however, insurance companies 
have cited the court’s application of the inverse condemnation doctrine to
justify their reduction or elimination of coverage.46 This leaves IOUs
financially vulnerable as wildfires grow in frequency and intensity each 
year. In response, IOUs have sought to recover uninsured wildfire liability 
costs through customer rates. 
III. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
California’s investor-owned electric utilities47 are regulated by the California 
Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC” or “Commission”).48  CPUC  
jurisdiction over IOUs is derived from Article XII, Section 3 of the California 
Constitution. The Constitution classifies private corporations that “. . .own, 
operate, control, or manage . . . the production, generation, transmission, or 
furnishing of . . . power . . . directly or indirectly to or for the public . . .” as 
public utilities subject to legislative control.49 
Section 454 of the California Public Utilities Code authorizes the 
Commission to review and approve a public utility’s proposed customer 
rate.50 Generally, the CPUC approves rates that “permit the utility to recover 
its costs and expenses plus a reasonable return on the value of property 
devoted to public use.”51 
The Commission’s ratemaking authority is guided by a “just and reasonable” 
standard derived from Section 451 of the Public Utilities Code.52  Section 
451 holds that all utility rates must be deemed just and reasonable, and 
that any rate found to be unjust or unreasonable is unlawful.53 Using this
standard, the CPUC conducts a reasonableness review of a proposed rate 
46. Joint Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Southern California Edison 
Company, Southern California Gas Company, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, A. 
09-09-020, filed Aug. 31, 2009. 
47. Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego 
Gas & Electric (SDG&E). 
48. American Microsystems, Inc. v. City of Santa Clara, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1042
(1982); see also County of Inyo v. Public Utilities Com., 26 Cal. 3d 154, 166 (1980) (clarifying 
that publicly owned municipal utilities are not regulated by the CPUC or any other supervising 
agency absent another legislative grant of authority). 
 49. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
 50. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454(a)
51.  Southern California Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 23 Cal. 3d 470. (1979). 
52. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451. 
53. Id.
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to determine whether the utility incurred recoverable costs in a reasonable 
and prudent manner.54 This is known as the prudent manager standard. 
The prudent manager standard considers whether a utility’s actions or 
decisions “. . . follow[ed] the exercise of reasonable judgement in light of 
the facts known or which should have been known . . .” and were expected
to “. . . accomplish the desired result at the lowest reasonable cost consistent 
with good utility practices.”55 
A. The 2007 Fires 
In 2007, over a dozen major fires burned through seven counties in 
Southern California.56 Investigations revealed that three of those fires
were caused by SDG&E’s power lines.57 As a result, over 2,500 lawsuits 
were filed against SDG&E for $2.4 bullion in total wildfire liability costs..58 
In pre-trial proceedings, the California Superior Court allowed plaintiffs
to pursue inverse condemnation claims against SDG&E.59 Since SDG&E 
knew it would be held to a strict liability standard, the IOU resolved a 
majority of the cases through settlements and mediations in an attempt to 
avoid higher litigation costs.60 
B. The Hearings 
In August 2009, prior to SDG&E’s resolution of the 2007 wildfire claims, 
the three electric IOUs, along with Southern California Gas Company 
(“SCG”), filed a Joint Application to the CPUC.61 In this application, the
IOUs sought CPUC authority to establish a Wildfire Expense Balancing 
Account (“WEBA”) and to recover these balances through retail rates.62 
The proposed WEBA would allow the IOUs to record and recover all 
uninsured costs arising from wildfire liability unless the Commission found
54.  24 CPUC 2d 476, 486. 
55. Id.
56.  Application to Recover Costs, A 15-09-010, filed Sept. 25, 2015, at 2.
 57. Id. 
58. Id. at 3. 
59. Id.
 60. Id. at 4. 
61. Joint Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Southern California Edison 
Company, Southern California Gas Company, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, A. 
09-09-020, filed Aug. 31, 2009. 
62. Id. at 1. 
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the IOU acted recklessly in accruing the costs.63 The IOUs declared that 
limited insurance coverage options made it necessary to have a mechanism 
allowing for rate recovery of growing uninsured wildfire costs.64 
In July 2010, the CPUC issued Resolution E-4311, which held that the 
applicants could establish Wildfire Expense Memorandum Accounts 
(“WEMAs”) while the Commission considered the Joint Application.65 
The resolution emphasized that, while the WEMAs would act to record 
most of the same costs in the proposed WEBA, the costs could not be
included in rates before a final decision was made.66 
By the time the CPUC came to a final decision in December 2012, both 
PG&E and SCE withdrew as applicants.67 The CPUC ultimately denied
SDG&E’s and SCG’s WEBA requests on the grounds that the application 
created an unlimited potential for ratepayers to cover uninsured wildfire 
costs while disincentivizing preventative measures to reduce the risk 
of wildfires.68 Though the WEBA was denied, the CPUC did allow SDG&E’s 
and SCG’s WEMAs to remain open subject to a later reasonableness 
review.69 
Pursuant to that decision, SDG&E later applied for CPUC authorization 
to recover the 2007 wildfire costs recorded in their WEMA.70 Of the $2.4
billion in total costs accrued, SDG&E sought to recover $379 million through 
customer rates.71 In a prehearing motion, SDG&E stressed that the application 
presented a legal issue of first impression to the Commission.72 Since the costs 
were incurred in the context of inverse condemnation, the IOU requested 
that the cost recovery be considered in the same context. Using inverse 
condemnation law, SDG&E would have been strictly liable regardless of 
fault. As such, SDG&E pushed for a reasonableness review of the steps 
taken to reduce total wildfire liability costs through settlement, and not to 
the operating and engineering practices that may have sparked the fire.73 
63. Id. at 5. 
64. Id.
65.  Resolution E-4311, Issued July 29, 2010. 
66. Id.
67.  Joint Application, at 3.
 68. Id. at 18. 
69. Id.
70. Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (U 902 E) for Authorization
to Recover Costs Related to the 2007 Southern California Wildfires Recorded in the wildfire 
Expense Memorandum Account, filed Sept. 25, 2015. 
71. Id.
72. San Diego Gas & Electric Company’s (U 902 E) Application for Rehearing of 
Decision 17-11-033 and Request for Expedited Action, A.15-09-010, filed Sept. 25, 2015, 
at 26. 
73.  Application to Recover, at 10–11. 
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Despite SDG&E’s emphasis on its cost reduction measures, CPUC
applied the prudent manager standard to the IOU’s management and
operation of its facilities prior to the ignition of each of the three fires.74 
Ultimately, CPUC found that SDG&E failed to “reasonably and prudently 
maintain its facilities.”75 As such, the costs were deemed unreasonable and 
the request to recover through rates was denied.76 The decision also ordered 
SDG&E to close its WEMA.77 
The denial signaled to the IOUs that, just as the courts will rule regardless 
of the regulators, the regulators will rule regardless of the courts. Though 
this was a novel legal issue, the Commission applied its traditional “prudent
manager standard” to the circumstances of the case. The Commission stated 
that inverse condemnation principles were “not relevant” to a Section 451 
reasonableness review.78 Indeed, the denial affirmed the Commission’s 
“exclusive jurisdiction” over ratemaking issues while citing an absence of 
79 superseding case law.
SDG&E filed a subsequent application for rehearing of the decision which 
argued, amongst other things, that the decision erred in preventing rate
recovery consistent with the cost spreading principle under the doctrine of
inverse condemnation.80 Ultimately, the CPUC denied SDG&E’s challenge
on all grounds. 
IV. THE CONFLICT REALIZED
SDG&E’s rehearing application and the CPUC’s subsequent denial
illustrate the reality of the conflict that Edison alluded to in Pacific Bell.
In its application, SDG&E argued that the CPUC’s failure to apply the 
cost spreading principle in its reasonableness review: (1) created an unnecessary 
conflict of laws; (2) produced an unjust and unreasonable result; and (3)
violated Constitutional takings principles. SDG&E’s position was that inverse 
condemnation’s strict liability standard superseded the Commission’s prudent 
74. Id.
 75. Id. at 72. 
76. Id.
 77. Id.
78. Order Denying Rehearing of Decision (D.) 17-11-033, D. 18-07-025, issued 
July 13, 2018, at 64. 
79. Id. at 65. 
80. Id. at 3. 
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manager standard. As such, IOU facility operations were irrelevant to wildfire 
cost recovery considerations since they would have been irrelevant to a 
court’s liability considerations. The Commission retained its position that 
inverse condemnation had no effect on the Legislature’s mandate that all 
cost reviews be just and reasonable. 
A. Unnecessary Conflict of Laws 
SDG&E first argued that the CPUC committed legal error in denying
the relevance of inverse condemnation to its review.81 It asserted that the
Commission is bound by the doctrine’s cost-spreading principle since it 
was derived from judicial interpretation of the California Constitution.82 
As such, the Commission improperly adhered to Section 451 rather than
inverse condemnation in the proceeding. In support, SDG&E cited PG&E 
Corp. v. Public Utilities Com., which found the Commission may not disregard 
“express legislative directions” or “restrictions upon its power found in
other provisions of [the Public Utilities Act] or elsewhere in general law.”83 
The Commission was unconvinced; neither the Court’s interpretation of 
inverse condemnation, nor its assumption that the CPUC would permit 
recovery amounted to an express directive or prohibition.84 
While it did not do so, the Commission could have further argued that
PG&E Corp. only applied insofar as it prohibited the Commission from
disregarding Section 451. Instead, the Commission rejected SDG&E’s 
conflict-of-law argument by making its own. The Commission reiterated
that not only did Section 451 require it to conduct a reasonableness review, 
the California Constitution also prohibited it from doing otherwise.85 Thus,
absent an appellate court ruling or an express legislative direction, the CPUC’s 
hands were tied. 
81. Rehearing App., at 13 (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1757(a)(2) “The commission
has not proceeded in the manner required by law,” and § 1757(a)(6), “The order or decision 
of the commission violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the United 
States or of the California Constitution.”). 
82. Id.
 83.  Id. at 14, PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1174, 1199 (2004)
(citing Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Com., 62 Cal. 2d 634, 653 (1965)). 
84.  Order Denying Rehearing, at 27. 
85. Id. at 26, (citing CAL. CONST., art. 3, § 3.5. “An administrative agency . . . has no 
power to declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it 
being unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination that such statute 
is unconstitutional.”). 
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B. Unjust and Unreasonable 
SDG&E then argued that the Commission’s approach created a
“fundamentally unjust and unreasonable whipsaw of inconsistent and 
incompatible legal standards” in violation of SDG&E’s due process rights.86 
Under inverse condemnation, SDG&E would have been at fault regardless 
of how prudently it managed its facilities. Despite this, the Commission 
based its reasonableness determination solely on imprudent maintenance
and operation of facilities. SDG&E felt this failure to align cost recovery 
considerations with how the costs were incurred “defie[d]logic and the
law.”87 
In response, the Commission doubled down on its statutory obligations, 
stating that inverse condemnation’s indifference towards reasonableness 
had no impact on Section 451.88  The Commission relied heavily on the fact
that the proceedings were split into two phases. Phase 1 considered maintenance 
and operation of facilities and Phase 2 was to evaluate the reasonableness 
of settlement costs. Since SDG&E failed to meet the Prudent Manager 
standard in Phase 1, the overall application was denied and the Commission 
never conducted a Phase 2 evaluation.89 As inverse condemnation had no
effect on SDG&E’s operations prior to the fires; it was immaterial to 
Phase 1’s reasonableness review.90 
C. Economic Taking
In its application, SDG&E made an economic takings argument that 
attempted to put the Commission in SDG&E’s shoes by applying inverse 
condemnation to the denial. SDG&E argued that the Commission’s denial 
amounts to an economic taking of SDG&E’s funds, without just compensation, 
for the public use of compensating those injured by the fires.91 Since the 
California Constitution prohibits such unjust taking for public use, the 
Commission’s decision was improper. To remedy this, SDG&E proposed 
86.  Rehearing App., at 16–17. 
87. Id.
88.  Order Denying, at 29. 
89. Id. at 30. 
90. Id. at 29. 
91.  Rehearing App., at 21. 
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that the Commission base its cost recovery review on the reasonableness
of their Phase 2 conduct.92 
As the Commission points out in its response, this argument’s main flaw is 
that it presumes guaranteed rate recovery for all costs.93 The Commission 
points to two Supreme Court cases which held: (1) an unlawful taking 
does not occur unless a regulation or rate is unjust or unreasonable; and 
(2) whether a regulation is just and reasonable depends on a balancing of
the interests of the entity and the ratepayers.94 Since the decision was
based on statutory obligations and established ratemaking practices meant 
to advance the protection of ratepayers from unjust and unreasonable 
rates, the Commission determined there was no unlawful taking.95 
D. Deadlock 
Just as Barham and Pacific Bell solidified the court’s approach to IOU 
wildfire liability, these proceedings solidified the Commission’s approach 
to the matter. Throughout the proceedings, the Commission remained
steadfast not only in its adherence to Section 451, but also in its position that
the reasonableness review ought to apply solely to facility management and
operation. Given the circumstances of inverse condemnation, SDG&E felt 
this focus was unreasonable. 
The CPUC’s emphasis on facility management seemed to indicate a 
position that IOUs can and must take steps to effectively avoid situations 
giving rise to wildfires.96 Indeed, the December 2012 Denial essentially 
used Commission ratemaking authority to incentivize prudent wildfire 
risk management techniques.97 While this may be beneficial in the abstract, 
such factors as climate change and increasing development along the 
wildlife-urban interface suggest this approach may become increasingly 
expensive and ultimately unrealistic.98 On the other hand, SDG&E’s 
suggestion to consider only the reasonableness of the settlement actions 
may be too lenient a standard. 
92. Id. at 22. 
93.  Order denying, at 31. 
94. Id. at 31 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989), and 
20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal. 4th 216, 292 (1994)). 
95. Id. at 31–32. 
96. Decision Denying WEBA, at 14 (“The duty to furnish and maintain safe equipment
and facilities is paramount for all California public utilities.”). 
 97. Id. at 15. 
98. That is not to suggest that the December 2017 Denial was unrealistic in its assessment 
of SDG&E’s maintenance and operation. The analysis of circumstances leading up to each 
of the three fires seems thoroughly substantial. Regardless, the sufficiency of the reasonableness 
review is not relevant to the topic at hand. 
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Since the Commission denied SDG&E’s application after Phase 1, it is 
unclear if or how inverse condemnation would have shaped the Phase 2 
review. In theory, Section 451’s vague language gives the Commission
the discretion to afford the doctrine some weight in a reasonableness 
review.
The Commission could have first completed both phases of review in 
which it applied a prudent manager standard to SDG&E’s pre-fire operations 
and post-fire settlements. The Commission could have then offset a 
portion of reasonable Phase 2 costs depending on the severity of Phase 1’s
finding of overall imprudence. 
This approach embraces inverse condemnation insofar as it allows
SDG&E to spread only the costs it reasonably incurred while holding it 
accountable for all costs that could have been avoided or mitigated through 
prudent management. Such an approach reflects a certain middle ground
that punishes imprudent management and prevents limitless liability from 
bankrupting the IOUs. This seems to align with the California Legislature’s
desire. As discussed below, the Legislature has sought to address these
issues through recent measures meant to encourage wildfire risk mitigation 
and maintain IOU financial stability. 
V. SB 901 
As wildfires become increasingly common and increasingly destructive,
the inverse condemnation conflict poses a significant financial threat to
the California IOUs. To address this, the California Legislature passed
Senate Bill 901 (“SB 901”) into law in August 2018. SB 901, dubbed “The 
Wildfire Bill,” contains various measures meant to encourage both prudent 
facility management and the IOUs’ financial stability in the face of growing 
wildfire threats. Two examples of these measures are the newly added 
Sections 451.1 and 451.2 to the California Public Utilities Code. 
A. Section 451.1
The original Section 451 contained a vague just and reasonable standard 
to guide Commission review of cost recovery applications. Section 451.1, 
however, provides the Commission with twelve non-exclusive criteria with 
which to review and approve costs specifically associated with catastrophic
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wildfires.99 While this may signal relief to the IOUs, it is hardly a bailout. 
Of the twelve criteria: six question the reasonableness of the IOU’s operation 
and management of assets in light of wildfire risk and two focus on compliance 
with various regulations. These effectively serve to codify the considerations 
the CPUC was already weighing. 
This new wildfire reasonableness standard also allows the Commission
to consider the extent to which expenses were caused by circumstances
beyond the IOU’s control and whether “extreme climate contributions” 
exacerbated damages.100 Inclusion of these criteria signal the Legislature’s
recognition that conditions may not always be within the IOU’s control. 
99. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451.1(a): 
(1) The nature and severity of the conduct of the electrical corporation and its 
officers, employees, contractors, and other entities with which the electrical 
corporation forms a contractual relationship, including systemic corporate 
defects. 
(2) Whether the electrical corporation disregarded indicators of wildfire risk.
(3) Whether the electrical corporation failed to design its assets in a reasonable
manner.
(4) Whether the electrical corporation failed to operate its assets in a reasonable
manner.
(5) Whether the electrical corporation failed to maintain its assets in a reasonable 
manner.
(6) Whether the electrical corporation’s practices to monitor, predict, and anticipate
wildfires, and to operate its facilities in a reasonable manner based on 
information gained from its monitoring and predicting of wildfires, were
reasonable. 
(7) The extent to which the costs and expenses were in part caused by
circumstances beyond the electrical corporation’s control. 
(8) Whether extreme climate conditions at the location of the wildfire’s ignition,
including humidity, temperature, or winds occurring during the wildfire, 
contributed to the fire’s ignition or exacerbated the extent of the damages. 
The electrical corporation shall provide the commission with specific evidence
and data demonstrating the impact of climate conditions on the severity
of the wildfire.
(9) The electrical corporation’s compliance with regulations, laws, commission 
orders, and its wildfire mitigation plans prepared pursuant to Section 8386, 
including its history of compliance. 
(10) Official findings of state, local, or federal government offices summarizing 
statutory, regulatory, or ordinance violations by any actor that contributed
to the extent of the damages.
(11) Whether the costs and expenses were caused by a single violation or multiple 
violations of relevant rules. 
(12) Other factors the commission finds necessary to evaluate the reasonableness
of the costs and expenses, including factors traditionally relied upon by 
the commission in its decisions.
100.   § 451.1(a), 7, 8. 
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Going forward, it remains unclear whether Section 451.1 will help to 
resolve the present conflict of laws or create new ones. IOUs may argue
these wildfire-specific liability considerations demonstrate a legislative 
intent to not hold IOUs strictly liable for wildfire damages. Alternatively, 
courts may find these express criteria to be unconstitutional since they
potentially conflict with the Constitution’s cost-spreading rationale. 
B. Section 451.2
While Section 451.1 only applies to review of wildfire costs incurred
on or after January 1, 2019,101 Section 451.2 addresses costs incurred as a 
result of wildfires ignited in the 2017 calendar year.102 
This Section creates a financial “stress test” for the Commission to utilize
in cost recovery proceedings. The CPUC must “. . . consider the electrical
corporation’s financial status and determine the maximum amount the 
corporation can pay without harming ratepayers or materially impacting 
its ability to provide adequate and safe service.”103 Upon this determination, 
the CPUC must ensure that the disallowed costs do not exceed that maximum 
amount.104 Subdivision (c) of this Section further allows for the IOU to 
seek a financing order for both the just and reasonable costs, as well as any 
costs and expenses in excess of that maximum amount.105 
Under Section 451.2, IOUs are still prohibited from recovering a majority 
of imprudently incurred wildfire costs from their rate bases, but only up 
to the amount that their financial situation allows. The new law now
requires the CPUC to allocate any disallowed liability costs in excess
of the maximum amount to the ratepayers, rather than to the IOUs.106 This
stress test provision is important as it represents the Legislature’s attempt 
to temper the potentially devastating financial consequences of holding 
IOUs strictly liable for all 2017 wildfire costs. 
In a way, Section 451.2 creates an inverse condemnation safety valve 
that allows for liability costs to be distributed between an IOU’s investors 
and ratepayers. IOUs remain liable for imprudently incurred costs, but only
to the point they can pay without going bankrupt. This outcome aligns with
101.  § 451.1(a).
102.  § 451.2(a). 
103.  § 451.2(b). 
104.  Id. 
105.  § 451.2(c). 
106.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 850.1(a)(1). 
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public interest, as it maintains utility stability while ensuring the IOU covers
most of the costs it could or should have mitigated through preventative 
measures.
This approach also preserves the Commission’s desire to incentivize
prudent wildfire mitigation practices through its ratemaking authority. 
Any 2017 wildfire costs remain subject to the original Section 451 prudent 
manager standard.107 Thus, the CPUC retains discretion to disallow recovery 
for any and all costs arising from imprudent facility management. 
As litigation for damages related to the 2017 fires moves forward,
Section 451.2 will likely provide some financial relief to IOUs but may
ultimately weaken their position in the courts. In past cases, IOUs attempted 
to argue that inverse condemnation should not apply because regulators 
prevented them from spreading losses as envisioned by the doctrine. Now,
regulators could allow for recovery of certain liability costs through rates.
As such, in the case of the 2017 fires, IOUs cannot claim that the loss-
spreading policy rationale behind inverse condemnation does not (in part) 
apply.
Section 451.2’s safety-valve mechanism only applies to cost recovery 
applications related to 2017 fires. Recovery for future fire costs will be
governed by Section  451.1’s new reasonableness standard without consideration
for whether or not disallowance will bankrupt the utility. If a utility declares 
bankruptcy, property owners seeking compensation for wildfire damages
will then have to compete with the IOUs’ creditors and insurers for payment. 
Further, utility bankruptcy could cause service interruptions or a fluctuation 
in customer rates. If utility-ignited wildfires continue to grow in size and 
frequency, Legislators may need to take additional action to avoid these 
outcomes. 
One way Legislators could act is by requiring the CPUC to incorporate 
inverse condemnation considerations in its cost-recovery review as suggested
at the end of Part IV of this Article. To achieve this, Legislators could amend 
Section 451.1’s review criteria to include whether an IOU prudently settled 
its wildfire liability claims. In its review, the CPUC can use its discretion
to offset any portion of their disallowance if total imprudently incurred
costs were significantly reduced by prudent settlement. That would allow for 
the CPUC to incentivize both prudent pre-fire facility management and
prudent post-fire settlement activities. This outcome serves the public
interest insofar as IOUs remain liable for imprudent pre-fire and post-fire 
activities, while ratepayers continue to only cover costs associated with just
and reasonable business practices.
107.  § 451.2(a). 
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Alternatively, Legislators could require the CPUC to conduct Section
451.2’s stress test in all future wildfire cost-recovery reviews. While this 
will help to avoid IOU bankruptcy, it may significantly impact customer 
rates if wildfire trends continue. 
VI. CONCLUSION
It seems likely that courts and regulators will remain steadfast in their 
respective positions towards IOU wildfire liability. Indeed, utilities are in
the best position to spread costs incurred for the public good. Further,
ratepayers should not foot the bill for an IOU’s imprudent actions. 
However, the reality and uncertainty of climate change suggest traditional
notions may need slight adjustment. As climate patterns shift and wildfires 
increase in frequency and intensity, IOUs must be proactive and take steps
to prudently manage their operations. Additionally, Legislators and regulators 
must consider the potential impact of holding IOUs liable to the point of 
insolvency. Such an outcome would deprive harmed individuals of just 
compensation and destabilize service for customers throughout California. 
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